هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
The Israeli public, along with those following politics in the occupying state, held its breath as it awaited the results of the first election since 7 October 2023. The vote came after the genocidal war in the Gaza Strip entered its fourth year and Israeli attacks expanded across the region. The identity of the next government therefore matters beyond domestic political competition, with a bearing on calculations about the war and the region’s future.
Although pre-election polls suggested neither camp would secure a decisive result, several gave an edge to parties united more by a desire to remove Benjamin Netanyahu than by a shared political programme. But the election returned Likud to first place, leaving complex negotiations to determine whether the party’s strength would translate into its camp’s ability to form a government.
According to updated preliminary results, Netanyahu’s camp holds 54 seats, compared with 47 for the change camp and 19 for Arab parties. That leaves Netanyahu seven seats short of a 61-seat majority, while his opponents, together with the Arab lists, theoretically hold 66 seats. But adding up seats on a results chart is far easier than bringing those who hold them together behind a single government. Broad Arab participation becomes the deciding factor, while the constraints the opposition places on its own chances of governing become apparent.
More surprises at the ballot box
Overall turnout reached 77.7 per cent, the highest since 1999, according to figures cited from the Elections Committee. Arab turnout was also high, estimated by Channel 12 at about 80 per cent, indicating the scale of mobilisation around this election. The Arab turnout figure remains a media estimate requiring confirmation once the data is complete. The seat distribution also remains provisional and will be affected by the remaining count and double-envelope ballots, including soldiers’ votes.
Comparisons between exit polls and the partial count therefore require caution. The ballot boxes counted first do not necessarily reflect the distribution of voters across the country, and a party’s first-place finish does not automatically give its leader the right to form a government. The mandate is assigned after the official results are announced and President Isaac Herzog consults the blocs, based on an assessment of the designated Knesset member’s chances of forming a government that can win a confidence vote.
إغلاق مراكز الاقتراع في انتخابات الكنيست الإسرائيلي بعد نسبة تصويت قاربت 75% https://t.co/EmLSNXPTUS
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) October 27, 2026
The current tally gives Netanyahu a psychological boost and puts an end to assessments that treated the failure of 7 October as sufficient to force him out of contention. Even so, 54 seats represents a loss of 10 from the 64 won by parties in his camp in the 2022 elections.
The scale of the vote also raises the issue of “wasted votes.” Votes cast for lists that fail to cross the 3.25 per cent electoral threshold are excluded from the allocation of seats. Preliminary results show Ofer Winter’s list — along with other small lists — struggling to clear it, a factor that reduced the number of seats secured by right-wing votes.
An unequivocally right-wing society
The composition of the competing forces allows for an assessment that goes beyond Netanyahu’s survival. The dispute over his premiership also runs through the right itself, and the opposition includes prominent right-wing forces, led by Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman, alongside the Zionist centre and left. The decline of Netanyahu’s camp is therefore insufficient grounds to conclude that Israeli society is reconsidering its overall political direction or its position on Palestinian rights.
This shift has deeper historical roots, spanning successive political eras. Likud’s rise to power in 1977 marked a decisive moment in ending Labor’s monopoly on power, while the occupation that began in 1967 created space for the expansion of the settlement project and the rise of religious Zionism. These transformations intersected with social changes that weakened the traditional labour elites and broadened the right’s support base.
A study by Maher Charif, “How Israeli society shifted toward the far right,” explains part of this trajectory through alliances bringing together sections of the Mizrahi Jewish population, religious people, Russian-speaking immigrants and settlers. Despite their differing interests, rejection of the dominance of the elite associated with the Labor Party, along with hostility towards the left and the Oslo process, helped bring these groups closer politically.
The study also links the decline of the Zionist left to the erosion of its social role, its adoption of economic policies that weakened its ties to disadvantaged groups, and its failure to offer a coherent alternative. Politically, continued settlement expansion, the collapse of the peace process and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 all helped undermine the possibility of a stable settlement. Then came the Camp David summit and the second intifada in 2000. The notion that “there is no Palestinian partner” spread, pushing sections of what was known as the “peace camp” towards security-based interpretations closer to the right’s discourse.
بعد فرز 60% من الأصوات.. معسكر نتنياهو يحصد 56 مقعدًا مقابل 48 لحزب آيزنكوت، والقوائم العربية تتقدم بـ16 مقعدًا دون بلوغ أي طرف عتبة الحسم (61 مقعدًا). https://t.co/T3uTM5rmEG
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) October 28, 2026
The current tally gives Netanyahu a psychological boost and puts an end to assessments that treated the failure of 7 October as sufficient to force him out of contention. Even so, 54 seats represents a loss of 10 from the 64 won by parties in his camp in the 2022 elections.
The scale of the vote also raises the issue of “wasted votes.” Votes cast for lists that fail to cross the 3.25 per cent electoral threshold are excluded from the allocation of seats. Preliminary results show Ofer Winter’s list — along with other small lists — struggling to clear it, a factor that reduced the number of seats secured by right-wing votes.
An unequivocally right-wing society
The composition of the competing forces allows for an assessment that goes beyond Netanyahu’s survival. The dispute over his premiership also runs through the right itself, and the opposition includes prominent right-wing forces, led by Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman, alongside the Zionist centre and left. The decline of Netanyahu’s camp is therefore insufficient grounds to conclude that Israeli society is reconsidering its overall political direction or its position on Palestinian rights.
This shift has deeper historical roots, spanning successive political eras. Likud’s rise to power in 1977 marked a decisive moment in ending Labor’s monopoly on power, while the occupation that began in 1967 created space for the expansion of the settlement project and the rise of religious Zionism. These transformations intersected with social changes that weakened the traditional labour elites and broadened the right’s support base.
A study by Maher Charif, “How Israeli society shifted toward the far right,” explains part of this trajectory through alliances bringing together sections of the Mizrahi Jewish population, religious people, Russian-speaking immigrants and settlers. Despite their differing interests, rejection of the dominance of the elite associated with the Labor Party, along with hostility towards the left and the Oslo process, helped bring these groups closer politically.
The study also links the decline of the Zionist left to the erosion of its social role, its adoption of economic policies that weakened its ties to disadvantaged groups, and its failure to offer a coherent alternative. Politically, continued settlement expansion, the collapse of the peace process and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 all helped undermine the possibility of a stable settlement. Then came the Camp David summit and the second intifada in 2000. The notion that “there is no Palestinian partner” spread, pushing sections of what was known as the “peace camp” towards security-based interpretations closer to the right’s discourse.
النائب العربي في الكنيست أحمد الطيبي يصرخ بوجه مستوطن يعمل في أحد مراكز الاقتراع، احتجاجاً على محاولته إبطاء عملية التصويت وعرقلتها. https://t.co/TPNhU82noL
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) October 27, 2026
In this context, the Arab lists’ combined tally of between 17 and 19 seats, according to the latest updates, gives them significant bargaining power. It does not make them a single coalition bloc or guarantee their willingness to back any alternative to Netanyahu in a confidence vote.
The opposition also remains divided over accepting their votes. Openness to such support runs up against Lieberman’s rejection, Bennett’s calculations and Eisenkot’s conditions concerning the government’s identity and conscription. In this context, the phrase “Zionist government” becomes a political constraint on representation that could, in numerical terms, tip the balance of power.
The idea of “passive support,” which had previously been discussed, also requires closer examination in light of the results. A confidence vote on a new government can be decided by a majority of votes in favour over those against, without requiring 61 affirmative votes in every case. But if all Arab lawmakers abstain and the two camps hold together at 47 versus 54, the opposition still loses.
تتفق المعارضة الإسرائيلية على هدف إزاحة نتنياهو، لكنها تنقسم حول الطريق إليه، وفي قلب هذا الانقسام تقف الأصوات العربية بين من يراها مخرجًا وحيدًا ومن يخشى ثمنها الانتخابي.
فهل تكون أصوات العرب هذه المرة الورقة التي تحسم إسقاط نتنياهو؟
https://t.co/DTsFixGqxt
✍️ @ahmad_m_tanani https://t.co/T6kUP83RQa
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) October 27, 2026
In this example, the opposition would need at least eight Arab votes in favour, with the remaining 11 abstaining, to move ahead by 55 to 54. If some of those lawmakers vote against it, the number of votes in favour required rises.
Joining a coalition therefore differs from supporting it from outside, and both differ from abstaining. Specific arrangements may allow a minority government to be formed, but its survival would require understandings extending beyond the confidence vote to the budget and legislation. Arab electoral strength becomes decisive to the extent that it can be translated into a sustainable political commitment, and that the opposition is willing to pay the price of recognising it.
Several scenarios, but deadlock prevails
The numbers constrain the routes available to both camps, while leaving room for manoeuvre. Netanyahu needs to attract forces from outside his current bloc, while the opposition needs an internal understanding before it can reach one with the Arab lists. Agreement on removing him is insufficient to overcome the competition between Eisenkot, Bennett and Lieberman over who would lead the alternative and on what terms.
The first option is an alternative government with Arab participation or outside support. The change camp and the Arab lists would together hold 66 seats if the current distribution is confirmed. But that figure assumes everyone agrees, and any withdrawal from the opposition would change the calculations. An understanding on toppling Netanyahu also requires agreement on what would follow, particularly on conscription, civil rights, war and settlement, where the limits of common ground between the parties become clear.
The second route is through the Knesset and legislation targeting Netanyahu’s eligibility to form a government. Lieberman has proposed replacing Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana and then advancing what is known as the “Defendant Law,” to open the way for a coalition that includes Likud without Netanyahu. The plan faces disagreements within the opposition, as well as questions of drafting, implementation and judicial review. Similarly, an eight-year limit on the premiership, if proposed, would not automatically disqualify Netanyahu. Its effect would depend on whether previous terms were counted and when the legislation took effect.
This route also requires Arab votes or defections from Netanyahu’s camp, confronting Lieberman with the paradox of relying on Arab lawmakers to pass legislation while rejecting reliance on them to form a government. The Arab lists may see an interest in ending Netanyahu’s rule, while recognising that a right-wing government without him could dispense with their support and reproduce policies that harm their public’s rights. It therefore cannot be assumed that they would back this plan without something in return, or that passing the legislation would be enough to change Likud’s leadership or secure an alternative government.
The third option remains a unity government or an arrangement under which Netanyahu and Eisenkot would rotate as prime minister. Reports citing sources close to Donald Trump described a US push for a unity government and efforts to influence its composition so as to limit the presence of Ben-Gvir and Religious Zionism. These reports take on significance in light of Trump’s public support for Netanyahu. So far, however, they do not amount to a declared US plan or an agreement between the two sides.
Commenting on the preliminary results, Trump gave an upbeat assessment of Netanyahu’s performance, taking the view that his support had helped improve Netanyahu’s chances. He also reposted a comment suggesting a tie or even a Netanyahu victory. This is important political backing, but it is not enough to secure a Knesset majority.
A unity government may give Netanyahu a chance to remain in office and break up his opponents’ alliance, while his supporters present it as a way out of the deadlock. But any rotation agreement would face a crisis of trust and require guarantees against sabotage of the kind Netanyahu previously carried out during his 2019 agreement with Benny Gantz.
If efforts to form a government continue to fail, a fourth option opens up: another election once the legal procedures have been exhausted. In the meantime, the outgoing government continues to perform its duties under the principle of governmental continuity, regardless of Likud’s first-place finish or the size of its new bloc. This continuity does not constitute a new electoral mandate, and the exercise of powers remains subject to law and judicial oversight. It nevertheless gives the head of government sufficient room for manoeuvre.
Netanyahu can use this time to shore up his base, address the fragmentation of right-wing votes and try to draw his rivals over to his side. But another election does not guarantee him a better result. It could instead prompt greater mobilisation against him or penalise whoever is blamed for the obstruction. A new regional confrontation after the US midterm elections also remains a possibility that could change all these calculations, depending on its outcome.
Arab participation has given the opposition a numerical opportunity beyond what it could achieve alone, testing its willingness to use that opportunity. If its parties put the exclusion of Arabs above the goal of removing Netanyahu, their options will narrow and his room for manoeuvre will widen. The Arab lists, meanwhile, must turn their substantial representation into tangible political and rights-based gains, while protecting their public from being used merely to bring a new government to power that then disavows their demands. Between these constraints, Likud remains in first place, and power depends on what each side is willing to concede and what it insists on excluding.
